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Detroit in the 1920s was an overgrown factory town, "a village of one 
million people", a journalist aptly remarked at the beginning of the decade. 
In banking and commerce it remained "relatively insignificant", its hinter-
land narrowly circumscribed by such rivals as Chicago, Cleveland, and 
New York. Industry therefore dominated Detroit to a degree unusual for a 
major metropolis. In addition, none of Detroit's peers in the urban hier-
archy so depended on a single industry for their livelihood as did the Motor 
City where automobiles, parts, and bodies accounted for fifty-seven per-
cent of local manufactures in 1927. As the remainder of Detroit's industrial 
output was scattered amongst more than 2,700 major manufacturing plants, 
the automobile companies and their suppliers easily constituted the city's 
dominant economic interest. 1 
Detroit, as a one-industry metropolis, affords an excellent laboratory 
for testing current hypotheses concerning the nature and structure of com-
munity decision-making between 1900 and 1930. Presumably automotive 
companies and executives possessed as much potential influence as any 
business interest in the country. Detroit in the 1920s was like Pittsburgh 
a classic example of "centralized private economic power". The auto-
motive industry was highly concentrated by 1928: Ford, General Motors, 
and Chrysler then accounted for eighty percent of United States passenger 
car production. The Big Three in other words exercised monopsonistic 
control over their Detroit-based suppliers, of which there were about 180 in 
1929, most of them small foundries and machine shops. A sense of self-
preservation made autoparts companies their faithful retainers. This was 
clear even in 1918 when th~argest contributors to Henry Ford's abortive 
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Senate campaign included the presidents of companies providing Ford with 
tires, wheels, bodies, grease cups and carburetors for the Model T. 2 
Few other industries had so many dependents and natural allies. 
Beyond the obvious - garages, repair shops, dealers, filling stations, 
motoring associations, subdividers, and highway construction firms -
automotive executives had also by the mid-1920s effectively colonized 
several local organizations including the Detroit Community Fund and the 
Board of Commerce. In 1922 the major automobile companies, led by 
General Motors and Dodge Brothers, saved the Board from imminent 
collapse by buying several hundred "plural memberships" for their em-
ployees. General Motors alone bought three hundred places at a cost of 
$10,000. Thereafter, in the 1920s at least, the Board depended for its 
survival on an annual infusion of automobile money. The Board responded 
with effusive praise, devoting an entire issue of its official journal in 
May 1923 to the theme that Detroit was the "Home of General Motors". 
Representative of the tone of the issue was the observation: "Take away 
every General Motors interest here, and Detroit would not today be the 
city it is. Stop the wheels in General Motors plants, and Detroit is struck a 
blow from which no community can soon recover." The Board was equally 
convinced of Ford's contribution to the city: "Take away the Ford Motor 
Company", it trumpeted in August, "and one has taken away half of 
Detroit." Ford "means life- means Detroit", it concluded. 3 
Accolades to the automobile industry by no means had to be pur-
chased. Before 1929 few Detroiters criticized either the industry or its 
product. "In Detroit ... the automobile is king", Delos Wilcox observed in 
1915, "and ... the city is obsessed with the doctrine that 'the king can do 
no wrong'." Henry Ford's personal prestige was still so great in 1918 
that he overturned the city's normal Republican majority to sweep the 
city in the Senate election as a Democrat by more than 30,000 votes. 
Ford at his peak wielded almost charismatic authority, as his presidential 
boomlet in 1923 confirmed; and the automotive elite as a whole, their 
leadership legitimized by the spectacular growth of Detroit from 286,000 in 
1900 to 1,570,000 in 1930, faced minimal local opposition. 4 
Few countervailing powers resisted automotive hegemony. The city's 
black population "were an inert political force", only one-third of whom 
even registered to vote in 1929, while the ethnic communities were dis-
rupted by rapid neighbourhood change. As for organized labour, it was 
2 Sam Bass WARNER, Jr, The Urban Wilderness (New York, 1972), p. 100; Allan 
NEVINS and Frank Ernest HILL, Ford: Expansion and Challenge /915-1933 (New York, 
1957), pp. 120, 149, 474; A. M. SMITH, Industrial Detroit (Detroit, 1930), p. 1; Keith 
SWARD, The Legend of Henry Ford (New York, 1972), p. 119; Detroit Times , 14 October, 
25 November 1918. 
3 The Detroiter, 13 (19 June 1922): 7; 13 (2 October 1922) : 5-10 ; 14 (14 May 
1923): 9; 14 (6 August 1923) : 7-8. 
4 Delos F. WILCOX, "The Street Railway Crisis in Detroit", The Economic 
World, Old Series, 96 (23 October 1915) : 527 ; NEVINS and HILL, Expansion and Challenge, 
p. 121; ScHOOL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND SOCIAL WORK OF WAYNE UNIVERSITY, Report 
no. 10, Accumulated Social and Economic Statistics for Detroit (Detroit, 1937), p. 3. 
THE CITY REMODELLED 453 
notoriously weak in Detroit after 1902, as the Motor City ranked second 
only to Los Angeles as a bastion of the "open shop". Only a few thousand 
workers belonged to the Detroit Federation of Labor. 5 
The weakness of potential rivals gave Detroit's automotive industry 
a unique opportunity to remodel a major American metropolis to its own 
liking. By examining the participation of the major corporations and their 
leaders in community decision-making it should be possible to gain new 
insight into the effective limits in the early twentieth century on the 
capacity -of big business to transform its economic power into political 
control over the larger cities. In particular, the Motor City in its heyday 
constitutes a fair test of the stratificationist model of community power 
structure proposed by James Weinstein and Samuel P. l{ays in two 
celebrated articles published in the early 1960s. 6 
I 
Until recently the Hays-Weinstein model of community decision-
making was the most widely accepted interpretation of basic power rela-
tions in American cities between 1900 and 1930. The model depicted the 
period as one of "increasing inequality" in power with the economic elite 
steadily adding to its political superiority until the Great Depression. Both 
Hays and Weinstein focused on the municipal reform movements of the 
era and concluded that "the leading business groups and professional men 
closely allied with them initiated and dominated" efforts to restructure 
municipal governments on the pattern of large, science-based corporations, 
with a consequent "integration and centralization in decision-making" at 
the expense of popular control. The city commission and management 
movement, Weinstein asserted, placed "municipal government firmly in 
the hands of organized business interests'', thereafter making ''economy, 
not service" the government's watchword. For Hays and Weinstein in the 
early 1960s the economic elite seemed to have enjoyed almost unlimited 
influence over American communities between 1900 and 1930. 7 
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therefore questioned the ability of past groups or individuals to control 
local decision-making and development. There have emerged, conse-
quently, four major critiques of the Hays-Weinstein model of community 
power. First, pluralists have protested that the model ignored the coalition-
building necessary to win electoral support for elite-sponsored reforms. 
Upper-class businessmen might propose, but only the large voting blocks 
could dispose. From the pluralist perspective the democratic process 
restricted the power of the economic elite, forcing it to accommodate the 
desires of other important groups in the city. Several recent studies have 
argued that the social, economic, and geographic configuration of the 
community has largely determined the prospects of elite reform. 8 
A second critique of the Hays-Weinstein model comes from the 
ecological determinists, among whom Hays himself must now be num-
bered. In a 1974 article, entitled "The Changing Political Structure of the 
City in Industrial America", Hays depicted urban development as "a 
constant tension between forces making for decentralization and forces 
making for centralization in human relationships and institutions, between 
centrifugal and centripetal tendencies, between social differentiation and 
social integration". Between 1900 and 1929, Hays averred, centripetal 
forces were temporarily ascendant because of the "growth of organization-
al technologies"; in centralizing decision-making within the metropolis, 
elite reformers were simply ''reshaping the political order according to the 
inner dynamic of the changing economic and social structure". From this 
perspective the autonomy' and hence the power' of the economic elite 
were limited by fundamental changes in technology and social organization 
that left little room for individual or group initiative. 9 
A third critique of the original Hays-Weinstein model also has a 
bureaucratic orientation. Developed most forcefully by Kenneth Fox, it 
asserts that "innovation in urban politics from the 1850s to the mid-1930s 
was a process in which business played little part." The leading role in 
setting municipal priorities between 1890 and 1930, Fox has stated, went 
not to elite businessmen but to middle-class experts in municipal law, 
administration, and political science. Not only did they draw up the basic 
blueprint for municipal reform, that is the "centralized, functionally de-
partmentalized administrative structure", but they also forced up local gov-
ernment spending by establishing the level of functions each had, ideally, 
to perform. While not denying that upper-class businessmen participated in 
reform campaigns, Fox sees them as less influential than the new middle 
class, for the latter seem to have enjoyed ideological leadership, perhaps 
even hegemony. 10 
8 See HAMMACK, "Problems", pp. 323-27, 335-37. 
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THE CITY REMODELLED 455 
A fourth and final critique of the Hays-Weinstein model of community 
decision-making stresses the self-imposed limitations on the political power 
of the economic elite. Thus Carl Harris has coupled his conclusion that 
"political power was roughly proportional to economic power" in Bir-
mingham, Alabama between 1871 and 1921 with the observation that 
"economically powerful groups" were not "equally interested in or in-
fluential in all policy areas and government functions; groups with domi-
nant influence on some areas had I"one on other issues." Major industrial-
ists in pa,rticular regarded few local issues as "salient" to their interests 
and so restricted their political interventions to a minimum. Harris thus 
challenges the notion of elite omnipotence implicit in the Hays-Weinstein 
model. 11 
II 
Detroit's experience with the automobile industry between 1910 and 
1929 tends to confirm the reservations of the critics. Judging from cor-
porate files, private papers of key executives, the business press, and the 
public record, the industry seldom intervened in community affairs. 12 
Moreover, its effective political power seemed to decline after 1918 even 
as its economic strength burgeoned. In 1929, as we shall see, the industry 
failed to carry a referendum deemed vital to its interests. From a different, 
less narrow perspective the difficulties the industry had in asserting its 
political will in the 1920s appear as contradictions inherent in its own 
economic preponderance. 
The basic contours of Detroit's development after 1910 were set by 
individual automobile companies through their entrepreneurial decisions 
concerning wages, product, technology, and factory location. As Roger 
Presthus has shown, such issues were essentially political in scope since 
they affected "the allocation of important resources" within the com-
munity. Given the American tradition of "privatism", corporate decision-
making by default assumed the task of city-building. Cities in the early 
twentieth century were not consciously constructed, but grew as a by-
product of industrial agglomeration. Housing necessary to shelter "labor 
pools of half a million workers'' had the appearance but not the reality of a 
great city. Detroit was not unusual therefore in having the most important 
decisions regarding its development made in the corporate boardrooms 
where they were not susceptible to public pressure or debate. 13 After 1908 
11 Carl V. HARRIS, Political Power in Birmingham /871-/92/ (Knoxville, Tenn., 
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the automobile industry used its economic leverage to decentralize the city. 
In part, executives were acting on their own biases: like most Americans 
they thought suburban living superior to the congestion of the inner city. 
Their product was also of course linked symbiotically to the suburbaniza-
tion process. Even more important in strengthening the centrifugal in-
fluences on Detroit, was the auto industry's decision, made individually by 
each company, to move manufacturing facilities to the urban periphery. 
Until 1908 most of the automobile companies had occupied vacant build-
ings in the older industrial districts on the Detroit waterfront and at 
Milwaukee Junction. But, as sales recovered from the Panic of 1907, auto 
producers began moving out to the newly-built Detroit Terminal Railway, 
the outer belt line, to take advantage of the cheap land and transportation 
facilities available there. Engirdling the central city like a noose with a 
radius of six miles, the outer belt offered Ford, Hudson, Chalmers (Chrys-
ler), and General Motors, among others, an opportunity to make the in-
novations in plant design and layout then deemed necessary to accom-
modate mass production. The key move to the periphery came in 1910 
when Ford moved his operations to suburban Highland Park. By 1916 his 
works there employed more than 33,000. 14 
Satellite communities, composed of cheap frame housing hastily built 
by real estate speculators, sprang up around the outlying plants. As few 
auto workers could afford to commute on the low wages prevalent in the 
industry before 1914, they wanted to live as close to work as possible, with 
the most immediate access going to the skilled who could afford to bid 
more for housing. After 1914 new subdivisions were built well beyond each 
of the plants, causing the population to disperse even more. Meanwhile, 
the outer belt factories "acted as magnets, drawing the city outward 
toward them", along the principal radials connecting each automotive 
complex with downtown. In the 1920s the most rapidly growing section of 
the metropolis still lay between the central city and the automobile plants. 15 
Between 1900 and 1920, under pressure from the automobile industry, 
Detroit's population frontier leapt seven miles beyond Grand Boulevard, 
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its effective boundary at the inception of the automotive era. Along the 
major transportation corridors the built-up area by 1929 extended twelve, 
even fifteen miles into the countryside. Even though the municipal bound-
aries were enlarged on twelve different occasions, and the city's area ex-
panded from 28 to 139 square miles in the process, Detroit failed to contain 
suburbanization politically, and by 1930 only three-fourths of the metro-
politan population remained within the jurisdiction of the municipality. 16 
The fragmentation of the metropolis had a social as well as political 
dimension. As late as 1900 Detroit had retained a compact, essentially pre-
industrial residential pattern, with the wealthiest families living closest to 
the central business district. Although some of the wealthy had already 
begun winterizing their summer homes in Grosse Pointe and upper-class 
subdivisions were slowly being built in Indian Village and the North 
Woodward district (both then situated in rural townships), most of Detroit's 
economic elite still lived within a mile of City Hall. They were kept there 
by incessant debate over the future of the privately-owned street railway 
system, a debate that retarded electrification and extension of its lines. But 
the street railway finally made its full impact felt in the 1900-10 decade, 
just as the automobile made its appearance. 
Together public and private transit shattered inner city neighbour-
hoods. The wealthy flocked to the restricted enclaves that realtors had set 
aside for them the previous decade. The mansions they abandoned de-
teriorated into rooming houses or gave way to auto dealerships and 
garages. As the blight spread, even those elite families most committed to 
urban living were forced to retreat into suburbia. Their displacement, 
coupled with dismay over the ignoble fate of their former homes and 
neighbourhood fed the sense of crisis pervasive in elite circles around 
1910. 17 
The city was also, from an elite perspective, becoming dangerously 
disorganized socially. Traditional community structures and control were 
proving inadequate to cope with a massive immigration of unskilled, single 
males lured to Detroit by the automobile industry. By 1910 three-quarters 
of the population were first or second generation immigrants, the majority 
of them residents of the city for less than a decade. An old Detroiter, that 
is one who knew it before the Motor City, became increasingly difficult to 
find. If Detroit had the same population turnover as cities of a comparable 
size, then it is likely that only seven percent of its residents in 1920 had 
lived there at the tum of the century. 18 
16 THOMAS, "City of Detroit", p. 58; WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY, Accumulated 
Statistics, p. 1; U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, Abstract of the Fifteenth Census of the 
United States, p. 76. 
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Customary constraints had little force with Detroit's mobile, polyglot 
population. The tone of public life can be inferred from the arrest in July 
1912 of three-fourths of the city council on charges of accepting a bribe. 
Socially, every indicator - whether it be the number of illegal "blind 
pigs", prostitutes, or muggings - revealed the extent of Detroit's social 
disorder. Between 1905 and 1910 police arrests climbed two and a half 
times as rapidly as the population. Over the next eight years the "crime 
wave" accelerated and by 1918 local businessmen were so panicky that 
they lent their private automobiles to two hundred State troops temporarily 
brought in, armed with shotguns, as a night watch. 19 
Auto executives responded to the city's social disorder by espousing 
reform. After 1910 they became involved in such traditional (for Detroit) 
causes as prohibition, municipal charter reform, and municipal ownership 
of the city's street railways. Soon, through dint of hard work, abundant 
energy, and heavy financial contributions, they dominated these move-
ments, thereby becoming a major force in Detroit's community decision-
making process. This had certainly not been true before 1910, at least at 
the formal, political level. During the industry's first decade in Detroit 
executives had been too busy to become civic activists. 
So preoccupied had they in fact been with the task of building their 
companies that not even the Employers' Association, local guardian of the 
"open shop" since 1902, had elicited much support from them. Most of the 
motor vehicle companies only became active in its affairs after Hugh 
Chalmers, president of Chalmers Motor Company, created an automotive 
division in 1910. zo 
By then, booming auto sales, spread among the handful of investors 
who controlled each company, had produced several instant millionaires. 
Their financial security assured , the founders of the industry surrendered 
active management to subordinates, thereby freeing themselves for com-
munity leadership. The industry had come of age; in 1909 it accounted 
for one-quarter of the city's manufacturing output, and would within five 
years contribute two-fifths. In 1910 the first of the " gasoline kings" were 
elected directors of the old-line banks and of the Detroit Board of Com-
merce. Economic power brought rapid social recognition: in 1912 Henry 
B. Joy, scion of one of the city's most prominent families and president 
of the patrician Packard Motor Car Company, joined Roy Chapin of the 
more plebeian Hudson Motor Car Company in organizing the Detroit 
Athletic Club. It took the D. A. C. less than four years to achieve social 
Detroit had a higher persistence rate of fifty percent, only 71 ,425 of Detroit's 993 ,687 
people in 1920 would have been residents of the city in 1900. See Stephan THERNSTROM, 
The Other Bostonians (Cambridge , Mass., 1973), p. 222. 
19 Jack D. ELENBAAS, "The Excesses of Reform", Michigan History, 54 (1970): 
1-18; WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY, Accumulated statistics, pp. 3-7 ; William P. LOVETT, 
Detroit Rules Itself (Boston, 1930) , pp. 27-28; Civic Searchlight (Detroit Citizens' League), 
1 (November 1914): 1-2 ; Detroit News , 26 (February 1918). 
2° CuLVER, "Reminiscences", pp. 6-10. 
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parity if not superiority vis-a-vis the more established downtown men's 
clubs. 21 
By 1912 Detroit's automotive entrepreneurs were stereotypical 
municipal reformers. They were already or would shortly become members 
of the local upper class and commanded one of the most technologically 
advanced industries of the era. It was perhaps inevitable, then, given the 
behaviour of similar elites elsewhere in America, that automobile exe-
cutives wanted to apply lessons gained in business to Detroit's municipal 
affairs. They believed their methods were, to quote Henry Ford, "capable 
of the largest application - that they . . . [had] nothing to do with motor 
cars but form[ed] something in the nature of a universal code". As usual, 
Ford had exaggerated hopes for reform for he proposed gearing the entire 
world to the fine-tuned efficiency of mass production; but other executives, 
less ambitious, settled for restructuring Detroit in the image of their 
business corporations. 22 
Thus Henry Leland, president of Cadillac, organized the Detroit 
Citizens' League in May 1912 to promote "moral and civic betterment in 
general, including politics where and when necessary". A "merger of 
business and religion'', the League depended on the Protestant brother-
hoods and men's clubs for the bulk of its executive and membership, while 
the automotive industry supplied approximately half of its finances. The 
auto industry's first major intervention in Detroit's community affairs 
began with Henry Leland's injunction to the Citizens' League: "Something 
is wrong with the politics of Detroit. Locate the trouble and fix it.'' Leland 
saw political reform as the necessary first step towards improving the 
"morality" of Detroit, his ultimate objective. The League soon pinpointed 
saloons as the "strongest supports of corrupt civic conditions". 23 
21 U.S. BuREAU OF THE CENSUS, Census of Manufactures 1914 (Washington, 
1918) I: 699; DAVIS, "Gasoline Aristocracy", pp. 219-25,230-45. 
22 Henry FoRD, My Life and Work (Garden City, 1922), p. 2; Henry FoRD, My 
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ber 1924): 102; Alfred P. SLOAN, Jr, "Modern Ideas of Big Business", World's Work, 
52 (September 1926): 695-99. 
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0. Bezner, Roy Chapin, and Richard H. Webber (Hudson); Hugh Chalmers (Chalmers); 
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The conclusion was predictable, not only because of the League's 
blue streak but also because Detroit's liquor dealers, both as individuals 
and as a municipal lobby known as the "Royal Ark" exercised inordinate 
power over local politics in 1912. By then the party battle had become a 
sham, the Democrats so weak that they readily joined an informal "Vote 
Swappers League" in hopes of winning a share of public office and patron-
age. Republican predominance had brought extreme factionalism, with no 
central machine capable of dictating to the various petty bosses who 
dominated the riverfront and industrial precincts through their control of 
the saloon and boarding-house vote. As Detroit's wards followed the 
boundaries of the old seigneuries, running in parallel strips perpendicular 
to the river, the results even in wards with a high density of upper-class 
housing could usually be dictated by the waterfront drinking establish-
ments, each of which reportedly had a minimum of twenty votes at its 
disposal. The saloons used this political power chiefly to maintain a 
friendly Common Council willing to overlook violations of the closing and 
licence laws. 24 
The Citizens' League therefore made the saloons its primary target. 
Frustrated in its original attempts to segregate them by district, it soon 
enlisted in the prohibitionist camp, becoming a second arm of the Michigan 
Anti-Saloon League. Both organizations relied heavily on the automobile 
industry for financial assistance: according to the secretary of the Citizens' 
League, "Leland, Ford, and the automobile leaders generally were among 
the chief supporters of the anti-saloon reform.'' The League secretary 
might have added that automotive leaders played a key role in the Anti-
Saloon League nationally as well. In 1919 the United States Brewers' As-
sociation in its report to the Senate identified eleven major contributors 
to the national League of whom six had strong ties with the auto industry: 
Henry Leland; Richard H. Scott, general manager of the Reo Motor Car 
Company of Lansing; Ransom E. Olds, president of Reo; J. L. Hudson, 
president of Hudson Motor Car Company; Joseph Boyer, one-time director 
of General Motors and stockholder in Packard, and in 1919 a major stock-
holder in the Lincoln Motor Company; and A. L. Garford, president of 
Garford Motor Company of Cleveland. A seventh - John Wanamaker, 
Ford's first distributor in Philadelphia- also had a tangential contact with 
the industry. 25 
Temperance sentiments came readily to those automobile executives, 
perhaps a majority, raised in middle-class households in the Protestant 
small towns and farming areas of the Midwest and New England. Paternal-
ists, who associated sobriety with morality and middle-class probity, they 
sought to protect their workers from both sin and social degradation by 
24 FINE, Murphy, p. 91; John C. LODGE, I Remember Detroit (Detroit, 1949), 
pp. 96-97; FRAGNOLI, "Transformation of Reform", p. II. 
2S LOVETT, Detroit Rules, pp. 29-55; Peter ODEGARD, Pressure Politics: The Story 
of the Anti-Saloon League (New York, 1928). Automotive industry involvement also 
comes through in several letters written by Pliny Marsh and William Lovett found in 
Citizens' League Papers. For the auto industry's role in blocking a wine-and-beer amend-
ment to prohibition in 1918 see Larry ENGELMANN, Intemperance : The Lost War Against 
Liquor (New York, 1979), p. 53. 
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banning the bottle. More generally, the industry's enthusiasm for prohibi-
tion grew out of its obsession with social and industrial efficiency. Alcohol 
impeded the assembly line, slowing production, creating accidents, and 
driving up costs. The new workmen's compensation law also brought 
"employers in Michigan to the dry side", Richard Scott of Reo observed, 
for it granted full compensation to any worker injured while intoxicated. 
Auto executives therefore readily agreed with Scott, successor to J. L. 
Hudson in 1912 as president of the Michigan Anti-Saloon League, that the 
"open saloon" was economically wasteful with "no place in this day and 
age". 26 
Even before the prohibitionist victory in November 1916, most of the 
big automobile factories had endeavoured to purge their work-force of 
drinkers. Possibly many of the discharged left the city; at any rate Detroit, 
like Michigan's other automotive centres, evenly divided on the prohibition 
question. As a result, the dry referendum easily carried on the strength of 
its rural support. That made Detroit "the first American city with a popula-
tion greater than 250,000 to go dry". The automotive industry's influence 
had indeed been felt. 27 
Prohibition removed the principal barrier to municipal reform. The 
precinct political machines were in disarray and provided only feeble op-
position to the charter campaign launched by the Citizens' League in 
1916. Largely financed by the automotive industry, headed by Hugh 
Chalmers, an automotive company president, and backed by the city's 
major business and civic organizations, the campaign easily prevailed over 
scattered opposition. In June 1918, in a small turnout, voters overwhel-
mingly endorsed a new city charter incorporating the programme approved 
by the National Municipal League in 1899. Detroit received a strong mayor 
with broad powers of appointment and dismissal and a small council 
elected at-large. To expunge politics from city government, the charter 
made most offices appointive and separated municipal elections, thereafter 
non-partisan, from state and federal voting. The charter, in other words, 
reconstructed municipal government as a poard of directors for administra-
tion of the city's business. The automotive reformers no more intended the 
new city government to be organized democratically than they would have 
allowed corporate decision-making to depend on majority vote. 28 
26 Detroit News, l October 1916; letter, Henry Leland to Mrs Albert Tower, 
3 June 1913, Citizens' League Papers; ELENBAAS, "Boss of the Better Class", pp. 145-
46; Detroit Saturday Night , 24 April 1915; George S. MAY, R . E. 0/ds : Automotive 
Pioneer (Grand Rapids, 1977), pp. 323-24, 385-88. 
27 ENGELMANN, Intemperance, p. 23; MAY, 0/ds, p. 385; SWARD, Legend of 
Ford, p. 59. 
28 Pliny W. MARSH, "Detroit Becomes a Home Rule City", Otal Reminiscences, 
BHC ; LovETT, Detroit Rules, pp. 90-98; FRAGNOLI, "Transformation of Reform", pp. 134-
67. The Citizens' League created a front organization - the Citizens' Charter Committee 
(headed by Hugh Chalmers) - to conduct the actual referendum campaign. The committee 
raised $15,657, almost all of which came from John and Horace Dodge (Dodge Brothers, 
Ford); Louis Mendelssohn (Fisher Body); Edsel Ford, C. Harold Wills, and Horace H. 
Rackham (Ford); Oscar Webber (Hudson); Arthur H. Buhl (Lozier); Henry B. Joy (Pac-
kard); Henry Leland (Cadillac); Joseph Boyer (GMC, ex"Packard); William H. Murphy 
(ex-Cadillac, later with Lincoln); and four downtown businessmen. 
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After 1918 the Citizens' League monitored elections to ensure that 
friends of the charter controlled city government. It concerned itself, to 
quote its secretary, "with problems of personnel", leaving "problems of 
technique" to the Bureau of Governmental Research, "a clearing house for 
information on municipal affairs" organized by two bankers in March 
1916. Also dependent on automotive money, the Bureau provided elected 
officials with the data and budgetary tools needed for informed decision-
making. It kept a close watch on government spending and, through its 
annual surveys, largely set municipal priorities. 29 
With the charter passed and two watchdog agencies in place to guard 
the interests of the large ratepayers, municipal spending suddenly took off. 
Previously, from 1900 through 1917, municipal tax revenues and net 
bonded debt per capita had risen forty-five and fifty-one percent respec-
tively, or not significantly more than the rate of inflation. But Detroit now 
embarked on a massive building programme to provide services hitherto 
neglected. Between 1918 and 1928 municipal tax revenues and net bonded 
debt per capita increased by 179 and 618 percent respectively. 30 
The surge in municipal spending in Detroit followed the national 
trend. Kenneth Fox has attributed the upward spiral to "increased familiar-
ity with the functional mode" of city administration. Cities were reacting, 
he argues, to the new standards laboriously worked out by political 
scientists, statisticians and the like (as opposed to businessmen), for 
municipal services and spending. "Comparative statistical reporting" made 
city governments acutely aware of their inadequacies and therefore open 
to reform. 31 
The argument, though plausible, fails to explain how the sense of 
deficiency was translated into practical reform. Fox's own evidence, plus 
the findings of numerous other scholars, show that elite organizations like 
the Citizens' League and the Bureau of Governmental Research either 
initiated or financed the feasibility studies that led to the restructuring of 
municipal functions. Presumably they hired specialists known to have ideas 
compatible with their own. Moreover, although a group like the auto-
motive entrepreneurs may have had their own reform ideas sharpened by 
hired experts, ultimately they found convincing only those arguments that 
jibed with their own experiences and interests. Above all, the lessons 
learned in business dictated their role in community affairs. Hugh Chal-
mers, for example, had already been responsible in 1908 for devising what 
29 LovETT, Detroit Rules, p. 108; DAVIS, "Gasoline Aristocracy", pp. 317-21; 
DETROIT BUREAU OF GOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH, A Quarter-Century of Citizen Concern 
with Government (Detroit, 1941); letters, Otto Kirchner to F. A. Cleveland, 25 March 
1916; E. W. Clark to Kirchner, 28 February 1916; Ralph Stone to Kirchner, 7 April, 
2 November 1916, Otto Kirchner Papers, BHC. The Bureau had forty-three subscribers to 
its financial fund as of 1 November 1916. They included E. W. Clark (ex-GMC); James 
Couzens, Norval Hawkins, Horace Rackham, and Gray Estate (Ford); Ford Motor Com-
pany; Hudson; Timken-Detroit; Cadillac; Packard; J. S. and T. H. Newberry (Packard). 
30 WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY, Accumulated Statistics, pp. 4, 7. 
31 Fox, Better City Government, pp. 63, 102. 
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may have been the first organizational chart drawn up within the auto in-
dustry. His interest in the functional mode (he chaired the Charter Cam-
paign Committee) flowed naturally from his earlier innovations in business. 
Undoubtedly, automotive entrepreneurs were, ideologically as well as 
financially, their own men. 32 
III 
The interest of automotive executives in shaping community deci-
sions waned after 1918. They did not seem to find many issues of salient 
interest in the 1920s. As much as anything World War I dulled their passion 
for public life. Regarding it as a giant reform crusade, they had rushed to 
enlist. One aging, overweight vice-president even joined the Marines as a 
private; but most executives sought a posting in Washington. By war's 
end some 463 of them were in "government employ", chiefly as dollar-a-
year men in the bureaucracies overseeing war production and internal 
transportation. Not content merely to serve, auto executives hoped to use 
their new vantage point to preach the gospel of efficiency, organization, 
and mass production to the nation. 33 
From within the government the industry's leaders conducted their 
own private reform crusades. Roy Chapin, for example, used his chairman-
ship of the Highways Transport Committee to promote good roads and 
trucking, while his partner at Hudson, Howard E. Coffin, campaigned 
incessantly for increased standardization of parts within the aviation in-
dustry, whose wartime output he oversaw as chairman of the Aircraft 
Production Board. Standardization was but one of the methods of mass 
production the industry wanted to teach the country. To show the inter-
connected whole, several Detroit automobile companies collaborated on 
the design and production of the "Liberty" engine for the air corps. Exe-
cutives hoped to prove that the assembly line could tum out an engine 
superior to those hand-crafted in Europe and in far greater quantities. But 
they miscalculated ; it took longer than anticipated to tool up for production 
and few planes equipped with Liberty motors ever went into combat. By 
August 1918 the public and Congress were restive. The Senate Committee 
on Military Affairs, searching for scapegoats, concluded that the air 
programme had failed because it had been ''placed in the control of the 
great automobile and other manufacturers who were ignorant of aero-
nautical problems". The would-be didacts now stood publicly accused of 
incompetence. 34 
32 See CHALMERS-DETROIT MOTOR Co., Pyramid Plan of Organization (n.p., 
1908), pamphlet located in Chalmers Motor Co. File, Detroit Public Library, National Auto-
motive Historical Collection. 
33 Herbert O'BRIEN , "Edwin Denby", unpublished MS, Edwin Denby Papers, 
Bentley Historical Library, Michigan Historical Collections; James J. FLINK, The Car 
Culture (Cambridge, Mass., 1975), p. 92. 
34 LONG, Chapin, pp. 147-52,; John Bell RAE, American Automobile Manufacturers 
(Philadelphia, 1959), pp. 126-27; Robert CuFF, War Industries Board (Baltimore, 1973), 
pp. 17-51; U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS, Hearings: Investigations of 
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Even more alarming were the allegations of conflict of interest cir-
culating in the Spring of 1918. In May the Administration removed Coffin 
from his chairmanship of the Aircraft Board and initiated an investigation 
into the activities of two of his assistants - Sidney Waldon, former vice-
president of Packard and Cadillac, and E. A. Deeds of Delco and General 
Motors. In November an investigating committee recommended prosecu-
tion of Deeds and Jesse Vincent, vice-president of Packard, for conflict of 
interest: they had as government officials approved contracts for their own 
companies. The two executives were eventually exonerated but not before 
their names had been dragged through the press. Nor did the industry's 
public relations ordeal end with their acquittal, for with peace came accusa-
tions of war profiteering and federal government suits against several 
automobile companies to recover alleged overpayments on military con-
tracts. The suits complicated the task of reconversion, obstructed credit, 
and made executives even more convinced that they had erred in be-
coming so entangled in government and politics. More concretely, a federal 
suit blocked the refinancing of Lincoln, thereby ending the automotive 
career of Henry Leland, Detroit's reform boss. He had taken his Cadillac 
profits and ploughed them into Lincoln; its failure prostrated him financial-
ly, leaving him without the means or influence to carry on his reform 
activities. The automobile industry had no one to replace him by the early 
1920s. 35 
The entire wartime experience conspired against auto executives' 
prewar activism and reformism. They had overreached themselves and, 
chastened, left the war with sharply reduced expectations and public am-
bitions. The war consequently marked a watershed in the role played by 
the automobile industry in Detroit's community power structure. Before 
1918 executives had sallied forth to do battle on almost any kind of terrain, 
but, bloodied by the great war crusade, they thereafter tended to restrict 
themselves to fields in which they held an unassailable advantage, as in 
transportation. Their earlier interest in structural municipal reform failed 
to survive the war. The defence of the new charter they left to the down-
town businessmen who in Detroit, as elsewhere, had a far more sustained 
interest in city government than did the great industrialists. Even in 1929, 
when a populist movement posed a direct challenge to the 1918 charter, 
the industry left its defence to the Board of Commerce and downtown 
merchants. Transportation issues alone brought out the industry's crusading 
streak in the 1920s. Auto executives, less certain after the wartime ordeal 
of their expertise in matters of government and social organization, re-
treated into the more specialized role of "transportation expert", the one 
title the community was least likely to deny them. Or so they thought. 
the War Department, 65th Congress, 2nd Session, 1917-18, p. 2281; Franklin H. MARTIN, 
Digest of the Proceedings of the Council of National Defense during the World War, 
U.S. Congress, Senate, 73rd Congress, 2nd Session, Doc. no. 193 (Washington, 1934), 
pp. 462-70; U.S. HOUSE, SELECT COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED 
STATES AIR SERVICES, Hearings, 68th Congress, 2nd Session, pt. 2 (Washington, 1925), 
pp. 1275-76. 
H INQUIRY INTO UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, Hearings, p. 1273; Isaac F. MAR-
COSSON, Colonel Deeds. Industrial Builder (New York, 1947), pp. 269-303. 
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IV 
After 1918 the auto industry's participation in community decision-
making was largely limited to the debate over municipal ownership of 
street railways, good roads, and subways. 36 Municipal ownership was a 
hoary issue by then, for the city had been debating its merits since the 
mayoralty of Hazen Pingree in the 1890s. By 1914, "no mayor, no judge, 
no coroner, no dog catcher could be elected to office until he had first 
declared himself for municipal ownership." With the constant threat of 
municipalization hindering the local traction monopoly, Detroit United 
Railway (D. U. R.), in its efforts to raise capital, new construction slowed 
to a crawl, the city's track mileage per capita as a result falling by almost 
half between 1899 and 1913. 37 
Even conservative businessmen came to see municipal ownership 
as a solution to the declining fortunes of mass public transit in Detroit. 
Little progress, however, was made towards it until passage of the Verdier 
Act in 1913 created the Board of Street Railway Commissioners and 
empowered it to acquire and operate a street railway within the boundaries 
of the municipality. With formation of the Board, the crusade for municipal 
ownership effectively became the property of the Ford Motor Company, 
for two of the three commissioners (the third represented the D. U. R. 
employees) belonged to the corporation's inner circle: John Dodge, a 
director and major stockholder, and James Couzens, general manager 
and second only to Henry Ford in the corporation hierarchy. The cause 
of municipal ownership thus gained powerful new backers. Yet it also 
inherited Ford's enemies, for there were many Detroiters, particularly 
within automotive circles, opposed to anything that Ford endorsed. 38 
Socially, the industry was quite fragmented, as the origins and 
outlooks of executives differed substantially from company to company. 
But the cleavage cutting most deeply separated Ford from the rest of 
the automotive producers. The cleavage stemmed from Henry Ford's 
first two automotive ventures, both of them costly failures which angered 
and dismayed his patrician backers. As a result, the Ford Motor Company 
encountered indifference, even hostility, from the city's economic elite 
upon its founding in 1903. A patent suit, launched almost immediately 
36 There is inadequate space to discuss the industry's good roads campaign here. 
See Kenneth E. PETERS, "The Good-Roads Movement and the Michigan Highway Depart-
ment, 1905-1917" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1973), pp. 133, 248; DAVIS, 
"Gasoline Aristocracy", pp. 340-47; and the S. D. Waldon Papers, BHC. 
37 Jere C. HuTCHINS, A Personal Story (Detroit, 1938), introduction by Malcolm 
Bingay; Detroit News, 15 July 1914. The street railway controversy can be followed in 
Graeme O'GERAN, A History of the Detroit Street Railways (Detroit, 1931), pp. 196-381; 
and Harry BARNARD, Independent Man : The Life of Senator James Couzens (New York, 
1958), pp. 101-33. For additional background see Melvin G. HoLL, Reform in Detroit : 
Hazen S . Pingree and Urban Politics (New York, 1969), chaps 5-6. 
38 O'GERAN, Street Railways, pp. 267-85; Harry DAHLHEIMER, Public Transporta-
tion in Detroit (Detroit, 1951), pp. 10-11. 
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by the Association of Licensed Automobile Manufacturers at the instiga-
tion of Henry B. Joy of Packard and Fred L. Smith of Olds, confirmed 
Ford's outcast status. It took eight years to fight the patent suit, the 
company's language becoming increasingly strident, populistic, and anti-
monopoly with each legal battle. Ford, company and man, paraded as 
the champion of the little man against the "interests" - the William 
Jennings Bryan of the automobile world. This pose hardened in 1913 
and 1914 when the company's banking and labour policies further anta-
gonized Detroit's elite, including the auto manufacturers. The five-dollar 
day, announced unexpectedly and unilaterally by Ford in January 1914 
without consideration of its impact on local factories, so widened the 
gulf between Ford and the other producers as to make it unbridgeable. 39 
Municipal ownership inevitably became entangled in their feud. In 
1915 the Board of Street Railway Commissioners, still dominated by 
Couzens and Dodge, asked Detroiters to approve by referendum purchase 
of the D. U. R., the exact price to be calculated later by the county 
court. The Ford leadership threw its prestige behind the purchase plan, 
Henry Ford pronouncing it "one of the safest business propositions 
I have heard of'. Yet the plan lost badly in the November balloting, 
as the opposition - an unlikely coalition of free enterprisers, municipal 
socialists, and trade unionists - denounced it for its indeterminancy, 
for no one knew what price the court would set. The most resounding 
negative came from the wealthier precincts, ample proof that divisions 
within the economic elite could make the major automobile manufacturers 
far less powerful than they seemed. 40 
Undaunted, James Couzens redoubled his efforts to obtain municipal 
ownership. His growing appeal as a populist and his prestige as a big 
businessman brought him the mayoralty in November 1918. In the final 
showdown against a machine politician, he enjoyed the united backing 
of the automotive community, but not so in the primary where Divie B. 
Duffield, patrician head of the Library Commission, was running at the 
prompting of several automobile entrepreneurs, the Bureau of Govern-
mental Research, the Anti-Saloon League, and the Detroit Citizen's 
League which "turned itself bodily into a Duffield-for-mayor club". 
The reform establishment did not trust Couzens, who had shown little 
enthusiasm for it in the past, to defend the charter. 41 
Although their misgivings proved unfounded, the reformers correctly 
perceived that the Ford executives whose company was remarkably 
unstructured for its size with few formal positions or responsibilities, 
had little interest in structural reform. They found transportation questions 
more interesting, perhaps because of the company's obsession with 
eliminating bottlenecks in the continuous flow of materials through the 
39 DAVIS, "Gasoline Aristocracy", chaps 5, 9. The best account of the Selden 
suit is found in William GREENLEAF, Monopoly on Wheels (Detroit, 1961). 
40 Detroit News, 13, 14 October, 3 November 1915. 
41 Detroit News, 24 August 1918; Detroit Times, 13 July, 22 August 1918. 
THE CITY REMODELLED 467 
Ford industrial complex. As well, the company, a leader in the outward 
movement of Detroit's factories after 1910, had an economic stake in 
improving the transit facilities of the metropolis. 42 
Couzens used the powers of the mayoralty, so recently enhanced 
by the reform charter, to compel the D. U. R. to sell its Detroit property 
in March 1922 at a price low enough to win overwhelming support from 
the city's cost-conscious voters. Detroit thus became the third major 
American city, after San Francisco and Seattle, to municipalize its street 
railways. Couzens' success proved that an automotive leader, if sufficient-
ly energetic and single-minded, could still get his way in community 
affairs. The automotive industry as a whole, however, had to count his 
victory as their loss, for executives had by and large opposed municipal 
ownership. 43 
v 
There was more at stake than the industry's feuds in the municipal 
ownership debate. Most auto executives objected to purchasing the street 
railways because they considered the tram outmoded and a combination 
of subways and buses a superior solution to Detroit's traffic congestion. 
They accused Couzens of burdening the city with a dying white elephant. 
Henry B. Joy and Alvan Macauley of Packard even organized a campaign 
in 1919 against municipal ownership around the theme: "The City's 
credit ... can ... better be saved for initiating a subway system." 44 
Couzens, however, had the power as mayor to bury the subway 
cause until municipal ownership had carried. He then resurrected it by 
creating the Rapid Transit Commission, or R. T. C., on 27 November, 
1922. Its membership consisted of Herbert W. Alden of Timken-Detroit 
Axle Company; Clarence W. Hubbell, former City Engineer; Willard 
Pope, vice-president of Canadian Bridge Company; Andrew H. Green, 
Jr, president of Charcoal Iron Company and a former director of General 
Motors; and as chairman, Sidney D. Waldon, afore-mentioned victim of 
the air scandal. 4 5 
From the start Waldon dominated the Commission. A British im-
migrant, trained as a locksmith, Waldon joined the automobile industry 
as a car tester but swiftly rose to the vice-presidency, first of Packard, 
42 For Ford's anarchic management practices see Charles E. SoRENSEN, My Forty 
Years with Ford (New York, 1956), pp. 36-37, 48-50; and FORD, My Life and Work, pp. 91-
94. 
43 O'GERAN, Street Railways, pp. 290-308, 347-72; BARNARD, Independent Man, 
ppp. 127-30. 
44 Detroit News, 24, 30 October, 4 November 1919. 
45 The organization of the R. T. C. can be followed in the correspondence be-
tween Couzens and the Rapid Transit Committee, Detroit Section, American Society of 
Civil Engineers, July-November 1922, Box 4, Detroit Mayor's Papers, 1922, BHC. See 
also Detroit News, 30 December 1922. 
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then of Cadillac. In 1916, though only forty-three, he retired from business 
a millionaire determined to "return to society some of the things that 
he . . . owed it". He devoted his retirement to promoting automobiles, 
highways, motor buses, air travel, and rapid transit - in fact, anything 
that increased "transportation efficiency". 46 
Above all he wanted to maximize the usefulness of the automobile, 
to him "the magic carpet of transportation for all mankind". "Its great 
efficiency for rapid transit" was, he lamented, "defeated by the very 
great numbers trying" to use it. Civilization had to choose, Waldon 
said: either it accepted "a gradually reducing efficiency of the motor 
vehicle", or it "set itself squarely to the problem of providing the in-
creased facilities essential to its best use". 47 
To unclog Detroit's choked traffic arteries, Waldon and the R. T. C. 
proposed widening the major thoroughfares and clearing them of street 
cars, with public transit going underground or - beyond the five-mile 
circle - down the median strip of 204-foot wide "super-highways". 
The Commission's "Master Plan" envisioned twenty such super-highways 
stretching over 240 miles and three counties, with space on each for 
surface rapid transit. While admitting that the system exceeded Detroit's 
current needs, the R. T. C. argued the financial importance of acquiring 
rights of way for future development while suburban land remained 
cheap. 48 
Super-highways appealed to the Motor City. Little opposition arose 
and the Common Council adopted the Master Plan in April 1925. Seven 
months later a referendum decisively approved a financial plan for land 
acquisition and street widening within Detroit. Beyond the city boundaries 
two super highway commissions oversaw implementation of the Master 
Plan using revenue raised by the state gasoline tax. By 1929 authorities 
had purchased more than one-third of the needed rights of way and 
Detroit was well launched towards freeway development. 49 
Subways had a different fate. The principal problem was their cost. 
Most of the super-highway system lay outside the city and county and 
so had little direct impact on Detroit taxpayers. But the city would have 
to assume most of the subway burden. The R. T. C. therefore spent two 
46 Clipping from Motor News, dated March 1945, Sidney D. Waldon File, National 
Automotive History Collection, Detroit Public Library; Detroit Saturday Night, 30 May 
1931; Detroit News, 21 January 1945. At the time of his appointment Waldon headed 
both the Detroit Automobile Club and the Detroit Aviation Society. 
47 Sidney D. Waldon to Colonel Robert McCormick, 25 July 1924, Rapid Transit 
Commission Papers, BHC (hereafter designated as RTCP); Sidney Waldon toT. S. Seeley, 
19 September 1923, Sidney D. Waldon Papers, BHC; Detroit News, 14 March 1926. 
48 Minutes, Rapid Transit Commission, 10 April 1924, and "Commission's Report 
to the Mayor for the Month of March", 3 April 1923, RTCP; Detroit News, 9 February, 
28 March 1929. 
49 
"Report on Proposed Ten Year Program for Street Widening", 22 March 
1930, RTCP; C. E. RIGHTOR, "The Progress of Rapid Transit in Detroit", National Municipal 
Review (March 1927), pp. 310-13. 
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years searching for a financial formula that paid for rapid transit without 
undermining Detroit's municipal credit. It finally decided that subways 
should be financed by those who benefitted most from them, namely, 
users and owners of abutting property. It wanted riders to pay for the 
rolling stock - approximately thirty-two percent of the total cost -
through ten cent fares. And as the R. T. C. saw no reason to enrich a 
few fortunate property holders, it assigned fifty-one percent of the cost 
to landlords within "proximity assessment zones" extending a half-mile 
on each side of subway lines. They were to pay a special tax assessed 
against the appreciation in the value of their property. A city-wide tax 
covered the remaining seventeen percent. As the financial plan mentioned 
no dollar figures, it easily carried a referendum held in September 1924. 
Detroiters obviously liked the idea of subways, at least in the abstract. 50 
Still, people balked at paying for them. In 1925 when it became 
clear that the R. T. C. planned to spend more than $200 million on sub-
ways, enthusiasm dwindled. The Michigan Manufacturers' Association, 
an organization controlled by Detroit's automobile companies, endorsed 
the programme of the R. T. C. but prevented a referendum on it. Ignoring 
this danger signal, the R. T. C. unveiled in August 1926 a comprehensive 
four line system, forty-seven miles in length, and costing $280 million. 
The plan had the virtue of thoroughness (see Map): the R. T. C. boasted 
that "420,000 out of 445,000 workers [would] have their jobs within a 
half mile of a rapid transit line". Aside from Henry Ford and the down-
town merchants, however, little support materialized. There was, the 
R. T. C. soon realized, "no organization, nor ... newspaper, that had 
the courage to endorse the plan as a whole". The Business Property 
Association told the R. T. C. that the city administration, Common 
Council, Manufacturers' Association, and small property holders were 
"more or less united in doubting the ability of the city to absorb the 
whole plan". 51 
Yet the R. T. C. resisted trimming its proposal. Research con-
vinced its members that "piecemeal construction" upset the population 
equilibrium, producing unmanageable congestion along the first lines 
built. To the mind of the automotive engineer it made no more sense 
to build a truncated transit system than to use conveyors in only one 
50 Detroit News , 24 August 1924. The R. T. C.'s activities and proposals for 
1923-25 can be followed in the News, 14 February 1925. 
51 Detroit News, 8 September 1924, 17 August 1926, 24 March 1929 ; minutes, 
Rapid Transit Commission, 29 November 1926; memorandum of conference with Mr Frick, 
9 November 1926, RTCP; Detroit Free Press, 27 August 1926. The R. T. C. hoped to have 
a referendum in the Spring of 1925 but the Manufacturers' Association bottled up the 
necessary enabling legislation in the State legislature, preventing a vote. The automobile 
industry's control of the Association can be inferred from the delegation it sent to the 
R. T. C. to discuss subways: Arthur T. Waterfall, vice-president of Dodge Brothers; 
Milton Tibbets, Packard counsel; Earl W. Webb of General Motors; Hal H. Smith, 
president of Hayes Manufacturing (wheels) and director of Federal Truck; J. Mallery , 
president of the Association; and John Lovett, its executive director. See Detroit News , 
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or two sub-assemblies in a factory. For maximum efficiency everything 
had to be in motion. Herbert Alden therefore said he "would rather see 
the whole thing go down to defeat than to make a compromise . . . detri-
mental to the interests of the city''. Clarence Hubbell and Waldon agreed, 
the former stating that ''as engineers their business had been to investigate 
and ascertain what was best for the city... They had recommended a 
system which offered city-wide service, and now if ... they yielded to 
pressure, ... the entire relation of the original work to the comprehensive 
plan would be lost." 5 2 
In January 1927 the R. T. C., bending before intense political pres-
sure, finally agreed to piecemeal construction. To preserve their profes-
sional pride as engineers and their self-image as reformers, the members 
had to find a new cause to champion. No longer could they tout the 
Master Plan as their major contribution to progress in Detroit. The Com-
mission therefore decided ''that the financial plan was the most important 
thing [it] had done and the routes and mileage could well be compromised 
to preserve the principle of special assessment", that is, the requirement 
that benefitted property holders pay fifty-one percent of subway costs. 
Engineering News-Record called the plan "an eminently equitable arrange-
ment, far in advance of anything carried out in rapid transit construction 
in American cities". Its implementation would assure the R. T. C. a place 
in the pantheon of municipal reformers. Moreover, with private property 
paying its fair share, the city would - the R. T. C. contended - have 
sufficient resources for eventual completion of the entire rapid transit 
system. 5 3 
Its reform zeal channelled into the financial plan, the R. T. C. was 
able to compromise on routes and in February 1927 submitted a scaled-
down proposal with a price tag of $135 million. That was still too much, 
for the local economy had soured: real estate values and automobile 
sales were falling and unemployment rising. On 10 March, Mayor John 
W. Smith shelved the proposal. Two months later Ford shut down pro-
duction, throwing 60,000 Detroiters out of work for six months or more 
while the company changed models. With its income cut and its welfare 
expenditures multiplied, the city pared departmental budgets to the bone. 
The R. T. C. barely survived. 54 
Ford rebounded in 1929, boosting the automobile industry to a 
record sales year. The R. T. C. judged the signs propitious for subways, 
52 H. W. Alden to Sidney Waldon, 2 November 1926; minutes, Rapid Transit 
Commission, 29 December 1926, RTCP. 
53 Minutes, Rapid Transit Commission, 5 January 1927, RTCP; clipping from 
Engineering News-Record, 4 April 1929, found in the Detroit Bureau of Governmental 
Research Papers, BHC; Windsor Star, 28 October 1925. For a study of the relationship 
between professionalism and reform see Edwin T. LAYTON, Jr, The Revolt of the Engineers : 
Social Responsibility and the American Engineering Profession (Cleveland, 1971), chap. 3. 
54 Memorandum of conference with Mayor's Finance Committee, 10 December 
1926; memorandum of meeting in Mayor's Office, 24 January 1927, RTCP; Detroit Free 
Press , II March 1927; Detroit News, 27 February, 12 March 1927; SWARD, Legend of 
Ford, p. 201. 
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provided that its plan were not overly ambitious. It proposed a $91 mil-
lion, thirteen-mile system, consisting of short street car dips downtown 
"built to rapid transit specifications" and a double-track line crossing 
the city via the Vernor Highway from the east-end factory district to 
Ford's Dearborn plant in the western suburbs. The plan contained two 
important concessions: first, the R. T. C., swallowing its distaste for 
piecemeal construction, reduced its Master Plan to one line; second, to 
win over the street railway department, a bitter foe in previous battles, 
the Commission included street car tunnels in its plan, even though it 
regarded them as an obstacle to "real train-operated rapid transit". This 
compromise also mollified public opinion by contradicting the prevalent 
view that the R. T. C. intended to eliminate the people's street railway. 
The R. T. C. had given in on virtually every front; only the financial 
guidelines of the 1926 plan remained intact. Benefitted property holders 
were still being asked to pay fifty-one percent of the cost. This was the 
one non-negotiable principle. 55 
The new plan won the support of a powerful coalition of business 
interests, including the downtown merchants. Poor sales the preceding 
Christmas convinced them that subways alone could counteract the 
growing tendency of people "to shop at the nearest available point, 
rather than come to the department stores". The Vernor Highway line 
per se did little to help them but they hoped it would get the subway 
movement rolling again. Similar considerations brought swift endorsements 
from the retail and wholesale merchant bureaus, the Employers' Associa-
tion, the Board of Commerce, the Detroit Engineering Society, and the 
Real Estate Board. Somewhat more circumspectly, for it was important 
to maintain the illusion of neutrality, the Citizens' League and Govern-
mental Research Bureau also enlisted in the cause. The grouping was 
not unusual: throughout the United States similar business coalitions 
had formed behind transit projects designed to avert the threatened decline 
of the central business district by reducing traffic congestion and improv-
ing its accessibility to outlying residents. Detroit's downtown, however, 
was in especially deep trouble because the city's commercial and financial 
sectors were so underdeveloped and because General Motors in 1919 
had elected to locate its headquarters three miles up Woodward at Grand 
Boulevard in an area it dubbed the "New Center". General Motors then 
energetically promoted it as a rival for the downtown's retailing and 
office functions. s6 
55 Report, J. P. Hallihan to Mayor John C. Lodge, 8 January 1929, Detroit Mayor's 
Papers; Detroit Free Press, 2 February 1929; Detroit News, 11 January 1929; Detroit 
Times , 10 January 1929. 
56 Memoranda of meetings with the Business Property Association, 26 December 
1928, 7 February 1929, RTCP; Detroit News, 27 January, 9 February, 24 March 1929; 
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The automobile industry added its weight to the subway campaign. 
It had made its position clear in 1925 when John Lovett, general manager 
of the state Manufacturers' Association, told reporters that industrialists, 
although alarmed by rising taxes, nonetheless wanted rapid transit be-
cause they saw no other way to change the fact ''that it takes an hour 
and a half for the average worker to get to his place of employment". 
Employers could expect neither punctuality nor alertness from factory 
hands dependent upon street cars, for the railway system had failed to 
keep abreast of Detroit's outward sprawl. Yet only twenty-five percent 
of industrial workers commuted by automobile in 1929 and the rest needed 
improved public transportation. In a way the assembly line itself dictated 
subways. Moreover, many executives probably agreed with Waldon that 
traffic congestion hurt automobile sales and reduced Detroit's appeal as 
a factory site. Some perhaps even shared his vision of a "new kind of 
city ... where there will be sunlight and air, [with] rapid transit on rails 
and rubber with ... far greater ... safety than now exists anywhere". 51 
Ford had an additional reason to embrace the R. T. C. plan: the 
proposed subway linked its principal plant at the River Rouge in Dearborn 
with twenty-seven of Detroit's twenty-nine street car lines. It therefore 
offered a solution to Ford's pressing logistical problems. As late as 1924 
three-fifths of Ford's employees in the Detroit area had worked at the 
company's Highland Park plant, located as the map indicates on Wood-
ward Avenue six miles north of the central business district. By 1929, 
however, Highland Park had only a skeleton force left; most of Ford's 
employees now commuted to the company's isolated River Rouge plant, 
six miles west of downtown along the V emor Highway. The Rouge in 
1929 employed 98,000 workers, or almost thirty percent of the city's 
industrial labour force. Few of them had cars: somewhere between one-
fifth and one-quarter came to work in their own vehicle in the late 1920s. 
The municipal ban on jitneys passed in 1926 further complicated Ford's 
task of gathering its workers each workday. 58 
The company's enthusiastic endorsement of the subway proposal 
was therefore to be expected, as was Edsel Ford's decision to join senior 
executives from Briggs Manufacturing, Packard, Hudson, Chrysler, and 
Timken-Detroit on the Citizens' Better Transportation Committee organ-
ized in February 1929 to direct the subway cause for the April 1st refer-
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endum. As usual, General Motors kept aloof from the campaign but did 
admit it wanted rapid transit, provided that Detroit passed a zoning law 
to forestall overcrowding along the route. 59 
Subways had formidable sponsors. The economic elite of Detroit 
had probably not been so united behind a project since the rise of the 
Ford Motor Company, for Ford generally went its own way. But now 
Ford, GM, Chrysler and the rest of Detroit's major business concerns 
were speaking with a single, authoritative voice. The subway coalition 
was, to .quote an opponent, the "biggest lobby Detroit [had] ever known". 
Yet only thirty percent of the registered voters turned out, and the propo-
sition went down to a "crushing defeat", winning only twenty-eight 
percent of the vote and fifty-five of 852 precincts. "The defeat of the 
project", the Detroit Free Press mused, "was more decisive than that 
received by any project in recent years." Although Waldon kept the 
R. T. C. alive and even came close in 1933 to winning federal financing 
for a Woodward Avenue subway, rapid transit as a local cause was pro-
strated by the 1929 debacle, and has only recently revived. Detroit's 
automotive industry had at the height of its economic power, on a matter 
of essential importance, suffered a complete rebuff. 60 
VI 
With less than thirty percent of the vote, subways appealed to a 
fairly select group. The R. T. C. identified them as "people who lived 
in hotels and apartment houses .. . and tenements", and complained that 
homeowners had resoundingly rejected the proposal by margins as high 
as ten to one. A study of the vote by precinct basically confirms the 
Commission's analysis. The wealthy, whether living in downtown hotels 
or in elite residential districts like Indian Village and North Woodward, 
gave a narrow majority to the plan. Their vote was not very important, 
however, for the suburbs had by 1930 lured away more than half of 
Detroit's "substantial families". 61 
Subways fared best in inner-city slum districts piling up substantial 
majorities in wards three, five, and seven on the near east side, home of 
the black and Jewish ghettos and port of entry to the city's recent im-
migrant groups. Subways did equally well in the "world of furnished 
rooms" hugging Woodward and Jefferson Avenues and the blighted 
factory district on the near west side (wards two, four and six). In other 
words, the city's poorest and most disorganized districts voted for the 
subway. The proposal in fact had a respectable showing, gaining forty 
59 Detroit News, 17, 24 March 1929; minutes, Rapid Transit Commission, 8 Feb-
ruary 1929, RTCP. 
60 Detroit News, 23 March, 2 April 1929; Detroit Free Press, 2 April 1929. 
61 Minutes of Department of Street Railways and Rapid Transit Commission joint 
meeting, 5 April 1929, RTCP; R. D. McKENZIE, The Metropolitan Community (New York, 
1933), p. 8. 
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percent or more of the vote, everywhere within the inner city, an area 
bounded in 1929 by Grand Boulevard. In 1900 this area had been virtually 
the entire city, the essential Detroit. But by the 1920s its vitality and 
population were being rapidly drained away by the encroachment of the 
central business district (growing rapidly because of the automotive boom) 
and the lure of better housing in the Zone of Emergence beyond the 
Boulevard. Most of the housing stock within the Boulevard was now 
obsolescent and depreciated by the invasion of such non-conforming 
uses as auto garages and body shops. So blighted had the central city 
become that the "population decrease, within the Boulevard", between 
1925 and 1929, "averaged thirty per cent per square mile". 62 
Residents of the inner city had little to lose by supporting rapid 
transit. Many of them were floaters, casual workers, unemployed single 
males, and unskilled labourers who in theory would benefit from in-
creased accessibility to the industries on the periphery. Yet the ten cent 
fare proposed for subways meant that the inner-city poor could expect 
little direct, tangible benefit from rapid transit. Their vote for subways 
may have been induced, then, by civic pride or loyalty to the city's 
leadership. In other words, the inner-city slums - the area most disorgan-
ized with the least sense of local community - may paradoxically have 
been the one section of Detroit able or willing to respond to the metropol-
itan vision of the subway lobby. It gave them succour in their poverty, 
perhaps, to think that Detroit was a great city, capable of an imperial 
accomplishment like a rapid transit system. 
Beyond the Boulevard a different perspective prevailed. The vote 
against rapid transit, as Graph 1 demonstrates, became progressively 
more one-sided as one moved away from the inner city. Within each 
ward, the anti-subway forces became stronger as the count moved away 
from the Detroit River, so that the massive no vote in the northern pre-
cincts of the first ward could overwhelm the inner-city returns. The 
geographical pattern lent credence to the R. T. C. claim that the outlying 
wards and neighbourhoods were simply voting their own selfish interests : 
they apparently "did not believe the east and west subway offered them 
any advantage", the Commission complained. But the response of the 
entire city beyond the three-mile circle was so uniformly hostile, even 
in areas promised service, that an additional factor must have been at 
work. 63 
It was the "fear of heavy assessments". The R. T. C. tried to 
explain that the financial plan expressly barred the city from charging any 
property holder more than his actual benefit from the subway ; but op-
ponents warned that the Commission intended taxing "purely theoretical" 
62 THOMAS, "City of Detroit", pp. 89-106. See also Mark GOLDMAN, "Buffalo's 
Black Rock : A Neighborhood and the City", Journal of Urban History, 5 (August 1979): 
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63 Sidney Waldon to James Couzens, 4 April 1929, RTCP. Only eight precincts 
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profits. Howard Starret, a leading critic, pointed out that the homeown-
er's profit depended upon selling his house, a difficult task once the market 
became glutted with forced sales. "The home owner receives no [imme-
diate] increase in money. His salary or wages will not increase but he will 
have to pay $2,200 on his home." 64 
Graph l. 
DETROIT SUBWAY REFERENDUM, Apr/11,1929 
(sixty percent vote needed for passage) 
60~------------------------~--------------------------1 
0'~--~~~~~~~~~~~-+_.~~~u.u.~~~~~--~ 
Wardno. 22 20 18 -16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 I 3 5 7 9 II 13 15 17 19 21 Ward no. 
WEST SlOE WARDS WOODWARD Ave. EAST SlOE WARDS 
Source: Detroit News, 2 April 1929. 
Detroit's small property holders did not trust City Hall to treat them 
fairly. They assumed that the "great business interests" would use their 
political influence to evade paying their share of the costs. Most people 
knew that the economic elite backed subways. Even had industrialists 
and merchants been more discrete, small property holders would have 
recognized the imprint of big business on the R. T. C. 's cherished financial 
plan, for the plan ignored land use in fixing assessments. A workingman's 
bungalow owed the same tax per square foot of ground space as a sky-
scraper if equidistant from a line or station. A letter to the Detroit News 
thus exaggerated only slightly when it claimed the R. T. C. wanted "home 
owners ... to pay the bulk of the cost as usual, while the downtown busi-
ness people would be the chief beneficiaries". 65 
Would the R. T. C. proposal have passed with a different assessment 
formula? Had the Commission, in other words, defeated itself by chan-
nelling its reform zeal into the financial plan? Perhaps, but it is more 
64 Detroit News, 4 February, 9 March, 2 April 1929; Detroit Labor News , 29 
March 1929. 
65 Detroit News, 4, 9 February 1929; Detroit Times, 12, 14 February 1929; minutes, 
Rapid Transit Commission, 5 April 1929, RTCP. 
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likely that the small property holders living beyond the Boulevard would 
have vetoed any proposal in 1929 that threatened either to raise their 
general taxes or to impose a special assessment on them because they 
were anxious to clamp a lid on municipal spending. They simply could 
not afford the grandiose plans of the automobile industry and its reform 
cohorts. Much of the city was already paying special assessments levied 
for opening and paving roads or laying sewers, and needed a respite. 
The municipal government was also not in adequate fiscal shape to under-
take a costly project; in 1926 it reached the constitutional limits on both 
its current budget and its borrowing. Although the R. T. C. plan was 
designed for that reason to be self-liquidating, the city's fiscal problems 
did not create a climate favourable to expensive new undertakings. 66 
The city would have enjoyed considerably higher revenues had it 
been able to tax the property of the Ford Motor Company, but the sub-
urban location of Ford's two plants protected them against Detroit's 
importunities. Although Ford had left Detroit behind, the bulk of his 
unskilled and semi-skilled employees had not. Unlike the better paid 
Ford workers who generally chose to live in Dearborn, Highland Park 
or in the new suburbs developing north of Eight Mile Road, they were 
forced to live in cheaper housing inside Detroit's city limits. Many of 
them ended up from time to time on the city's relief rolls. Job security 
at Ford was minimal in the late 1920s: in addition to the six-month shut-
down in 1927, the company forced extended furloughs on its work-force 
each winter, as did most of the other producers. In Detroit relief for the 
unemployed was to an unusual degree a public matter. In 1929, ninety-
five percent of relief granted in Detroit came from public funds, as com-
pared to an average of fifty-four percent for seventy-four cities. The auto 
industry's layoffs therefore placed a special strain on the city's finances. 
In March 1930 Detroit's per capita expenditure for public relief was the 
highest of 117 cities reporting. Its slowness to respond to the auto in-
dustry's call for a $280 million subway system (as proposed in 1926) is 
understandable. 67 
The pattern for Ford - skilled workers living in exclusive suburbs; 
unskilled and semi-skilled, in the city proper - was copied by most of 
the major automobile companies. As a result, Detroit in the 1920s was a 
"working-class spread city" with most of its middle class departed for 
the suburbs. Behind them, between the inner city slums and Detroit's 
boundaries, lay a vast middle ground of working-class homes : a Zone of 
Emergence into which the ethnic ghettos had emptied themselves after 
1914. Ford's five-dollar day, announced in January of that year, ushered 
in an era of high wages that made possible a ten percent increase in the 
percentage of homeowners in Detroit during the 1920s, even as the city 
lost much of its middle class. With wages of five dollars a day or more, 
66 Detroit News, 7 April 1926, 7 January 1927. 
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unskilled workers were able to leave behind obsolete, typically rented, 
housing in the inner city and to move as homeowners · into the zone 
beyond the Boulevard. As a result, two-fifths of Detroit's families were 
homeowners in 1930, a high percentage for a city that large. 68 
Thus the auto industry's decisions concerning wages and plant 
location had created a sprawling city of "working class homeowners". 
But what the industry had with great fanfare given, it later quietly had 
to take away. After 1925 automotive wages fell behind the rate of inflation 
as manufacturers, suffering from excess capacity and a saturated market, 
sought to improve their competitive position by reducing labour's share 
in the value added by manufacturing. Real wages fell so rapidly that the 
trend towards increased homeownership reversed. In late 1926 the bottom 
fell out of the local real estate market, causing great distress in the Zone 
among homeowners, many of them recent immigrants from Italy, Poland, 
or the Balkans, who found that they could no longer escape a heavy 
mortgage by a profitable resale. Ford, by shifting production to the River 
Rouge, threw the Polish districts around his Highland Park plant into 
turmoil, as many Poles had to sell their homes on a depressed market in 
order to move closer to their jobs at the Rouge. Their anger towards Ford, 
and that of other empioyees subjected to the 1927 layoff, the incessant 
factory speed-ups, and the cuts in real wages may have contributed to 
the massive rejection of Ford's subway scheme by the eighteenth and 
twentieth wards, the area of the city closest to the Rouge complex and 
therefore probably the home of most of its line workers. 69 
The Zone's decision to reject the subway is not, then, all that sur-
prising. The working-class homeowners of Detroit simply could not afford 
the dreams of engineers. This was made only too clear in mid-1929 when 
four of the city's six private Italian banks collapsed. With the Depression 
the next two years saw Detroit struck by a wave of mortgage foreclosures. 
According to Jane Addams, fifty thousand Detroiters lost the equity in 
their property during a two-month period in 1931. 70 
Despite the difficulties of the Zone's marginal homeowners, the 
subway lobby might yet have prevailed, given its organizational advantage 
and the refusal of any of the city's leading politicians to speak out against 
the rapid transit proposal. To defeat an alliance as powerful as the one 
assembled by Waldon and the automobile industry, homeowners needed 
leadership. They found it in the Committee of Fifty-One, a coalition of 
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neighbourhood improvement associations organized in January 1929 by 
Howard Starret, a "well-to-do engineer and real estate operator", to 
oppose subways and promote charter reform. It claimed to have ten 
thousand "active workers", each of them pledged to deliver ten votes 
for the cause. It blanketed the city with mimeographed broadsheets and 
its campaign workers telephoned or visited most of the homes in Detroit. 
A budget operation apparently financed by Starret, the Committee of 
Fifty-One was, nonetheless, extremely effective in portraying rapid transit 
as a plot to enrich Ford and the downtown merchants at the expense 
of the neighbourhoods. 71 
The Committee owed much of its success to the groundwork laid 
by its two parent organizations - the Property Holders' Protective As-
sociation and United Community Associations. Starret created the former 
in 1920 to battle proposed city-wide zoning on behalf of the principal 
downtown landlords. The City Plan Commission, authorized by the 1918 
charter to draw up a comprehensive zoning ordinance, sought to impose 
severe restrictions on high-rise development in Detroit. Downtown 
property owners, their eyes on Manhattan's skyscrapers, wanted no 
upward limit on buildings or profits and so created a lobby that staved 
off zoning until 1940, making Detroit one of the last major cities in North 
America to enact a comprehensive ordinance. 
The lobby prevailed for twenty years because it also served the 
interests of several thousand Detroiters who owned blighted residential 
property inside Grand Boulevard. This land had little value unless it 
could be sold for commercial development, and so inner-city property 
holders stoutly resisted any attempt to restrict land use in residential 
neighbourhoods. They looked to the protective association to restrain the 
planners and to defend their interests at City Hall. By 1927 the small 
property holders had achieved total dominance of the protective associa-
tion and were even using it to attack the large business interests that 
had founded it. Starret, an ambitious man with his sights on the mayoralty, 
probably guided the takeover; small property holders did, after all, have 
more votes than big business. 72 
But the latter was much better organized. With political parties 
neutralized by the non-partisan ballot, organizations like the Citizens' 
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League, Governmental Research Bureau, Board of Commerce, and the 
daily press enabled the business elite to dominate municipal affairs to 
the virtual exclusion of competing interests. 73 To defeat this imposing 
host the protective association needed allies, which it found in civic 
improvement associations. These, like Detroit's neighbourhoods, coa-
lesced in the Zone of Emergence after 1918 around one of the major 
arteries fanning out of the hub. Thus Woodward, Fort, Jefferson, Gratiot, 
Michigan, and Grand River Avenues created improvement associations 
with several hundred members or more. The associations were usually 
organized by businessmen anxious to protect property values during an 
economic and population boom that changed the character of streets 
with alarming rapidity. 
Where large business interests predominated, as on Woodward, 
improvement associations accepted elite rule and endorsed subways. But 
the Gratiot association, among others, became a bitter foe of rapid transit 
after small property holders from the outlying subdivisions took charge. 
The improvement associations represented the emerging neighbourhoods 
at City Hall, arguing for increased public services at less cost to small 
property owners. They lobbied hard against special assessments but to 
little avail until Starret persuaded about a dozen of them - later twenty-
five - to federate as United Community Associations in March 1927 
under the leadership of two lawyers, Veno Sacre and Joseph Primeau; 
a realtor, F. W. Harding; and a radio dealer, Paul Benzien. Financially 
and ethnically, these men had little in common with Detroit's elite, but 
they accurately reflected the population mix of the outermost wards. 74 
"To kill rapid transit" was the explicit objective of United Com-
munity Associations and its leaders played an important role in the 1927 
subway debate. The members disagreed, however, about the desirability 
of a charter amendment sponsored by Howard Starret and the Property 
Holders' Protective Association. Starret therefore fused together sym-
pathetic elements within both organizations to form the Committee of 
Fifty-One. No one knew exactly how much support the Committee 
enjoyed because it refused to identify its members. Starret explained: 
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"Representatives of improvement associations ... are not rich men. They 
often work for others so their names are not given out to be pilloried 
by the newspapers and their jobs endangered." 75 
The anonymous rebels combined their assault on subways with 
an attack on the 1918 charter. They alleged that "organized wealth" -
"the land owners, the manufacturers, the downtown merchants" -had 
"foisted [it] upon the community" to obtain a "free hand" in Detroit. 
The "charter ... was non-partisan for everybody except the controlling 
group", the Committee charged. "To them it was assuredly partisan, 
because it operated in their interests." 76 
For proof of elite domination the Committee pointed to rising taxes, 
special assessments, and increased municipal debt. It proposed a "revi-
sion of the charter to restore representative government" as a solution. 
To make the Common Council more responsive to the neighbourhoods, 
it advocated restoration of the ward system and election of "budgeteers", 
also by ward, to oversee departmental spending and fix the tax rate. 77 
An initiative petition put the charter amendment on the ballot in 
October 1929. Business leaders vigorously attacked the Committee of 
Fifty-One as would-be ward politicians. The press, taking up the chant 
as well, closed its pages to the Committee while giving the Board of 
Commerce, which "headed up the opposition to the Starret Plan", a 
"total of 960 inches of free text matter". Detroit's business leaders won 
the battle, even though the automotive industry offered little help in 
defending its own reform offspring. The amendment narrowly lost and 
Starret, defeated for the mayoralty two years later, soon faded from the 
scene. The charter survived. 78 
VII 
The 1929 offensive of the small property holders thus ended in a 
draw. Overall, how_ever, it was clear that Detroit's economic elite, and 
more specifically the automotive industry, had for two decades largely 
gotten its way. Granted some of its victories proved hollow. Although 
there has not been space here to follow the fate of prohibition in Michigan 
and of municipal government under the new charter, it suffices to say 
that the progress of both disillusioned the industry's reformers in the 
75 Memorandum of hearing in Council Chamber, 8 April 1927, RTCP; "What is the 
Committee of 51?", Detroit, Committee of Fifty-One, Miscellaneous Material, BHC; 
RAMSEY, "Some Aspects", p. 192. 
76 
"Inside Information on the Recall and Taxes"; Detroit Saturday Night, ll May 
1929. 
77 Detroit Saturday Night, II May 1929; FRAGNOLI, "Transformation of Reform", 
p. 334. 
78 Minutes, Governmental Committee, Board of Commerce, 15 October 1929, 
Detroit Bureau of Governmental Research Papers, BHC; FRAGNOLI, "Transformation of 
Reform", p. 334. 
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1920s. Under prohibition the illegal liquor trade blossomed into. a $215 
million business, employing fifty thousand locally, thus making it Detroit's 
second largest industry. It also took prohibition only seven years to in-
crease the number of retail liquor establishments ten-fold. As for the 
1918 charter, it did seem to protect business interests; certainly it in-
creased spending on the city's infrastructure. Yet it did not prevent and 
may even have contributed to the city's communal tensions in the 1920s. 
The elections that decade usually hinged on religious antagonisms, with 
the Ku Klux Klan temporarily acting as one of the city's power brokers. 
Perhaps the Klan might not have become as influential had the new charter 
not closed more traditional avenues of protest and political access by 
overcentralizing the municipal government. Still, there is no evidence that 
Detroit's religious war impinged on the prerogatives of the automobile 
industry. 79 
The chief limits on the industry's power seem to have been largely 
self-generated. As we have seen, automotive executives made the key 
decisions shaping the economy and social geography of Detroit. These 
decisions were, as Samuel Hays has suggested, dictated to some degree 
by a technological imperative; and once the auto industry had set the 
basic course for Detroit's development after 1910, social forces did evolve 
beyond the industry's control. Thus, the homeowning group that defeated 
the subway proposal was in essence created by the industry whose plant 
location and wage policies made possible both the development of a 
marginal homeowning class of unskilled and semi-skilled workers and 
its subsequent reduction into an embattled pressure group, hostile to 
the industry's transit programme for Detroit. 
The subway defeat showed the contradictions produced by the 
industry's economic power. Auto executives could not by spending a 
few thousand dollars on promoting rapid transit reverse two decades of 
socio-economic development that their expenditure of several hundred 
million dollars on wages, production, and materials had produced. In 
other words, the dimensions of automotive power in Detroit were not 
sufficiently grand to include the ability both to force thousands of families 
to move from Highland Park to Detroit's west end and then to persuade 
them, once settled, to vote for subways and higher taxes. As rapid transit, 
unlike the industry's wage and plant location policies, required a refer-
endum, there was scope for popular resistance. In that respect, the 
pluralist critique of Hays and Weinstein is correct. But it is only a minor 
nuance in a general theme of automotive dominance. 
Far more limiting for the automotive industry's power in Detroit 
was its sporadic interest in commurtity affairs. Only a few issues captured 
its attention; most elicited only ritualistic observations. Moreover, the 
automobile industry's involvement in community decision-making seems 
79 ENGELMANN, Intemperance, pp. 125-26. For Detroit's politics of race and creed 
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to have declined after 1918. The subway defeat might have been less 
one-sided (it probably could not have been avoided, given the hostility 
of the Zone) if auto executives had campaigned for rapid transit as ag-
gressively as they once had for prohibition or "good government". But 
as the industry and its leadership aged, the energy and optimism of their 
youth withered. A cautious conservatism replaced the former desire to 
remake the city. 
The rise of the multi-nationals further reduced the role of the auto 
industry in the community power structure. Before World War I there had 
been two or three dozen automobile companies operating in Detroit 
at any given time. Most had only a handful of stockholders, almost 
invariably local capitalists, and their fates depended upon one or two 
"engineer-entrepreneurs". Usually one man - a Henry Leland, Roy 
Chapin, or Hugh Chalmers - dominated so completely that the firm 
became an extension of his personality; and he, as a result, experienced 
little difficulty enlisting its prestige and resources for his favourite civic 
cause. 80 
But war and postwar depression eliminated most of Detroit's auto 
producers. By 1929 only seven remained and three of these - Ford, 
Chrysler, and General Motors - did most of the business. As the small 
companies crumbled, the influence of their founders waned and defence of 
industry interests increasingly devolved upon the Big Three. 
Chrysler and General Motors had great potential power but their 
impersonal, highly-structured bureaucracies could not wield it with the 
same self-assurance as entrepreneurs of the progressive era. Salaried 
managers had no authority to jeopardize sales by embroiling the corpora-
tion in municipal politics, and in the interests of promotion they shied 
away from controversy. Absentee stockholders, most of them institutional 
investors, controlled both companies, and key executives operated out of 
New York. Neither company considered itself a Detroit firm. Moreover, 
their world-wide scope reduced their interest in local problems. They 
apparently wanted rapid transit but did not campaign vigorously for it. 
Multi-national corporations, General Motors and Chrysler did not attempt 
a very active role in local decision-making. 81 
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Henry Ford obviously had stronger local ties, even if his plants lay 
outside the city boundary. Since he owned his company outright, it 
obeyed his every whim and fancy. He definitely wanted subways but 
his endorsement no longer helped a cause. His mishandling in 1927 of 
the model changeover, a mistake that put 60,000 out of work for six 
months, did much to tarnish the lustre of the automobile industry. Its 
claims to expertise must have been greeted more cynically after the 
bleak winter of 1927-28. 
That may explain some of the hostility that surfaced in February 
1928 towards the R. T. C., whose alleged "arrogance" and "stubborn-
ness" became the target of several newspaper editorials and speeches 
in the Common Council. With the city's economy in a Ford-induced 
slump, the Council pressed the R. T. C. to reconsider an alternative plan, 
known as the Miller-Schorn system, for rapid transit via express streetcars. 
Miller-Schorn had the great virtue, from the Council's perspective, of 
offering rapid transit for a fraction of the cost of subways. It did not of 
course appeal to the R. T. C., still hoping one day to see the entire city 
interlocked by an underground system. On several occasions since March 
1925, when Harry R. Miller, a realtor, and Nicholas J. Schorn, a tanner, 
had first presented their "system" to the Council, the R. T. C. had testily 
rejected the proposal as both impractical and likely, if adopted, to block 
construction of a subway. From the tone of the R. T. C.'s reports it was 
clear that its engineering staff resented the deference given the two ama-
teurs. In February 1928 the Commission, when pressed once again to 
study the express proposal, refused "even [to] talk with Miller and 
Schorn". 82 
The Commission came under heavy attack for its stubbornness in 
the first half of 1928. One Councilman alleged that it was composed of 
"professional subway promoters interested only in their pet schemes ... 
I don't want to see a meritorious plan rejected", he said, "because a 
small group wants to wait years and years for subways and won't try 
anything else in the meanwhile." In an editorial the Detroit Times agreed 
that ''the Rapid Transit Commission is ... more to be pitied than censured. 
What has the commission to do now except block possible transit relief 
that does not include its scheme of subways ?" 8 3 
With the return of prosperity (of sorts) in the second half of 1928 
pressure on the R. T. C. to compromise abated, and it was able to have 
a vote scheduled for the following spring. The Detroit Times, a critic 
the previous year, even called for an affirmative vote. "The financial 
plan is hard for the average citizen to understand", it admitted, but its 
soundness was assured by "the names of the men .. . asking that the 
proposition be approved". The subway plan, "if ... sound enough for 
82 Detroit News, l3 January 1926, 14 February 1928; Detroit Times, 14 February 
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industrial and business heads, ... should be sound enough for the average 
citizen". Detroiters in other words were asked to trust the experts. 84 
Yet the average citizen appeared certain neither of the disinterest-
edness nor of the competence of the R. T. C.'s staff and allies. United 
Community Associations objected that the project's "design [had] been 
determined by political expediency instead of engineering efficiency". A 
full-page newspaper advertisement purchased by a Detroit realtor went 
farther: "Great Stress is Laid on the Fact that It is Approved by Some 
Eminent .Engineers" , it read, but "These Men Are Not Infallible." 
Another realtor wondered whether the financial aspects of the subway 
proposal "should ... be left entirely to engineers, however capable they 
may be in their own line " . 85 
In other words, the subway referendum represented in one of its 
many guises a revolt against the claims to special expertise by the indu-
stry and of the engineers who ran it. The outcome of the balloting suggests 
that the critique of the Hays-Weinstein thesis by Kenneth Fox and other 
proponents of the "new middle class" hypothesis requires the cautionary 
note that in Detroit, at least, a backlash against the "new middle class" 
professionals and bureaucrats had developed by the late 1920s, with 
obvious implications for the future distribution of power within the com-
munity. 
The automobile industry had based its claims to leadership in Detroit 
on both its economic success and its technical expertise, professing in 
other words to be not only stronger but also wiser than other Detroiters. 
For more than two decades the two roles had reinforced each other, 
giving the industry unprecedented power in Detroit. Yet the combination 
of roles ultimately made it easier for small property holders to unite 
against them. Some supporters of the Committee of Fifty-One objected 
to class rule, as embodied in the R. T. C.'s financial plan, while others 
simply denied the expertise of the R. T. C. and its automotive allies. 
The subway issue allied the two camps, the revolt against the "interests" 
merging with the revolt against the "experts". Small property holders of 
the Zone were tired of elite domination, whatever its rationale. 
The subway revolt, however satisfying it was to Detroiters in the 
Spring of 1929, had unfortunate consequences. The auto industry had 
been trying through its advocacy of rapid transit, municip_al ownership, 
and structural reform of municipal government to reintegrate a community 
fragmented by the industry's economic policies. Its transportation reforms 
were designed, by reducing the two hours needed to cross the metropolis 
by public transit, to knit the city closer together and to increase the 
mobility and flexibility of the city's workforce. To be sure, the industry 
was no altruist in trying to shorten its workers' commuting time. But 
84 Detroit Times, 16, 25 March 1929. 
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Detroit might also have gained from an automobile victory on 1 April 
1929, for as Waldon predicted in a post-mortem, the long commute "to 
factories outside of the city [could not] help stimulating the up building 
of new home areas also outside of Detroit, and the consequent further 
blighting of already depressed districts inside ... [the] city". 86 
Admittedly, it is impossible to know for certain whether rapid transit 
would have retarded Detroit's decline. In a low-density city like Detroit, 
it may only have further imbalanced the city budget, perhaps permanently. 
Yet the referendum verdict did have one definite negative result: it reduced 
the auto industry's responsibility to Detroit. Before 1929 the industry's 
power in the Motor City seemed limitless : it was therefore possible for 
residents, including auto executives themselves, to believe that the indus-
try could and should intervene forcibly to improve the social conditions 
that their business policies had produced. But it was more difficult after 
1 April 1929 to assert that the auto industry wielded sufficient influence to 
tum the situation around. After all, transportation was the industry's spe-
cialty, and yet its unanimous advice had been rejected. Thus, the referen-
dum by exposing the limitations on the power of the industry and its execu-
tives, paradoxically reduced their obligations to Detroit, thereby freeing 
them to pursue more energetically their own self-interest. 87 
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